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DUAL SELECTION GAMES
STEVEN CLONTZ
Abstract. Often, a given selection game studied in the literature has a known
dual game. In dual games, a winning strategy for a player in either game may
be used to create a winning strategy for the opponent in the dual. For example,
the Rothberger selection game involving open covers is dual to the point-open
game. This extends to a general theorem: if {range(f) : f ∈ C(R)} is coinitial
in A with respect to ⊆, where C(R) = {f ∈ (
⋃
R)R : R ∈ R ⇒ f(R) ∈ R}
collects the choice functions on the set R, then G1(A,B) and G1(R,¬B) are
dual selection games.
1. Introduction
Definition 1. An ω-length game is a pair G = 〈M,W 〉 such that W ⊆ Mω. The
set M is the moveset of the game, and the set W is the payoff set for the second
player.
In such a game G, players I and II alternate making choices an ∈M and bn ∈M
during each round n < ω, and II wins the game if and only if 〈a0, b0, a1, b1, . . .〉 ∈W .
Often when defining games, I and II are restricted to choosing from different
movesets A,B. Of course, this can be modeled with 〈M,W 〉 by simply letting
M = A ∪ B and adding/removing sequences from W whenever player I/II makes
the first “illegal” move.
A class of such games heavily studied in the literature (see [7] and its many
sequels) are selection games.
Definition 2. The selection game G1(A,B) is an ω-length game involving Players
I and II. During round n, I chooses An ∈ A, followed by II choosing Bn ∈ An.
Player II wins in the case that {Bn : n < ω} ∈ B, and Player I wins otherwise.
For brevity, let
G1(A,¬B) = G1(A,P
(⋃
A
)
\ B).
That is, II wins in the case that {Bn : n < ω} 6∈ B, and I wins otherwise.
Definition 3. For a set X , let C(X) = {f ∈ (
⋃
X)X : x ∈ X ⇒ f(x) ∈ x} be the
collection of all choice functions on X .
Definition 4. Write X  Y if X is coinitial in Y with respect to ⊆; that is, X ⊆ Y ,
and for all y ∈ Y , there exists x ∈ X such that x ⊆ y.
In the context of selection games, we will say A′ is a selection basis for A when
A′  A.
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Definition 5. The set R is said to be a reflection of the set A if
{range(f) : f ∈ C(R)}
is a selection basis for A.
Put another way, R is a reflection of A if for every A ∈ A, there exists f ∈ C(R)
such that range(f) ∈ A and range(f) ⊆ A.
As we will see, reflections of selection sets are used frequently (but implicitly)
throughout the literature to define dual selection games.
We use the following conventions to describe strategies for playing games.
Definition 6. For f ∈ BA and X ⊆ A, let f ↾ X be the restrction of f to X . In
particular, for f ∈ Bω and n < ω, f ↾ n describes the first n terms of the sequence
f .
Definition 7. A strategy for the first player I (resp. second player II) in a game G
with moveset M is a function σ : M<ω → M . This strategy is said to be winning
if for all possible attacks α ∈ Mω by their opponent, where α(n) is played by the
opponent during round n, the player wins the game by playing σ(α ↾ n) (resp.
σ(α ↾ n+ 1)) during round n.
That is, a strategy is a rule that determines the moves of a player based upon
all previous moves of the opponent. (It could also rely on all previous moves of the
player using the strategy, since these can be reconstructed from the previous moves
of the opponent and the strategy itself.)
Definition 8. A predetermined strategy for the first player I in a game G with
moveset M is a function σ : ω → M . This strategy is said to be winning if for
all possible attacks α ∈ Mω by their opponent, the first player wins the game by
playing σ(n) during round n.
So a predetermined strategy ignores all moves of the opponent during the game
(all moves were decided before the game began).
Definition 9. AMarkov strategy for the second player II in a game G with moveset
M is a function σ : M × ω → M . This strategy is said to be winning if for all
possible attacks α ∈ Mω by their opponent, the first player wins the game by
playing σ(α(n), n) during round n.
So a Markov strategy may only consider the most recent move of the opponent,
and the current round number. Note that unlike perfect-information or predeter-
mined strategies, a Markov strategy cannot use knowledge of moves used previously
by the player (since they depend on previous moves of the opponent that have been
“forgotten”).
Definition 10. Write I ↑ G (resp. I ↑
pre
G) if player I has a winning strategy (resp.
winning predetermined strategy) for the game G. Similarly, write II ↑ G (resp.
II ↑
mark
G) if player II has a winning strategy (resp. winning Markov strategy) for
the game G.
Of course, II ↑
mark
G ⇒ II ↑ G ⇒ I 6↑ G ⇒ I 6↑
pre
G. In general, none of these
implications (not even the second [4]) can be reversed.
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It’s worth noting that I 6↑
pre
G1(A,B) is equivalent to the selection principle often
denoted S1(A,B) in the literature.
The goal of this paper is to characerize when two games are “dual” in the fol-
lowing senses.
Definition 11. A pair of games G(X), H(X) defined for a topological space X are
Markov information dual if both of the following hold.
• I ↑
pre
G(X) if and only if II ↑
mark
H(X).
• II ↑
mark
G(X) if and only if I ↑
pre
H(X).
Definition 12. A pair of games G(X), H(X) defeind for a topological space X are
perfect information dual if both of the following hold.
• I ↑ G(X) if and only if II ↑ H(X).
• II ↑ G(X) if and only if I ↑ H(X).
2. Main Results
The following four theorems demonstrate that reflections characterize dual selec-
tion games for both perfect information strategies and certain limited information
strategies.
The duality of the Rothberger game G1(OX ,OX) and the point-open game on X
for perfect information strategies was first noted by Galvin in [5], and for Markov-
information strategies by Clontz and Holshouser in [3]. These proofs may be gen-
eralized as follows.
Theorem 13. Let R be a reflection of A.
Then I ↑
pre
G1(A,B) if and only if II ↑
mark
G1(R,¬B).
Proof. Let σ witness I ↑
pre
G1(A,B). Since σ(n) ∈ A, range(fn) ⊆ σ(n) for some
fn ∈ C(R). So let τ(R, n) = fn(R) for all R ∈ R and n < ω. Suppose Rn ∈ R for
all n < ω. Note that since σ is winning and τ(Rn, n) = fn(Rn) ∈ range(fn) ⊆ σ(n),
{τ(Rn, n) : n < ω} 6∈ B. Thus τ witnesses II ↑
mark
G1(R,¬B).
Now let σ witness II ↑
mark
G1(R,¬B). Let fn ∈ C(R) be defined by fn(R) =
σ(R, n), and let τ(n) = range(fn) ∈ A. Suppose that Bn ∈ τ(n) = range(fn) for
all n < ω. Choose Rn ∈ R such that Bn = fn(Rn) = σ(Rn, n). Since σ is winning,
{Bn : n < ω} 6∈ B. Thus τ witnesses I ↑
pre
G1(A,B). 
Theorem 14. Let R be a reflection of A.
Then II ↑
mark
G1(A,B) if and only if I ↑
pre
G1(R,¬B).
Proof. Let σ witness II ↑
mark
G1(A,B). Let n < ω. Suppose that for each R ∈ R,
there was g(R) ∈ R such that for all A ∈ A, σ(A, n) 6= g(R). Then g ∈ C(R) and
range(g) ∈ A, thus σ(range(g), n) 6= g(R) for all R ∈ R, a contradiction.
So choose τ(n) ∈ R such that for all r ∈ τ(n) there exists Ar,n ∈ A such
that σ(Ar,n, n) = r. It follows that when rn ∈ τ(n) for n < ω, {rn : n < ω} =
{σ(Arn,n) : n < ω} ∈ B, so τ witnesses I ↑
pre
G1(R,¬B).
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Now let σ witness I ↑
pre
G1(R,¬B). Then σ(n) ∈ R, so for A ∈ A, let fA ∈ C(R)
satisfy range(fA) ⊆ A, and let τ(A, n) = fA(σ(n)) ∈ A ∩ σ(n). Then if An ∈ A
for n < ω, τ(An, n) ∈ σ(n), so {τ(An, n) : n < ω} ∈ B. Thus τ witnesses II ↑
mark
G1(A,B). 
Theorem 15. Let R be a reflection of A.
Then I ↑ G1(A,B) if and only if II ↑ G1(R,¬B).
Proof. Let σ witness I ↑ G1(A,B). Let c(∅) = ∅. Suppose c(s) ∈ (
⋃
A)<ω is defined
for s ∈ R<ω. Since σ(c(s)) ∈ A, let fs ∈ C(R) satisfy range(fs) ⊆ σ(c(s)), and let
c(s⌢〈R〉) = c(s)⌢〈fs(R)〉. Then let c(α) =
⋃
{c(α ↾ n) : n < ω} for α ∈ Rω, so
c(α)(n) = fα↾n(α(n)) ∈ range(fα↾n) ⊆ σ(c(α ↾ n))
demonstrating that c(α) is a legal attack against σ.
Let τ(s⌢〈R〉) = fs(R). Consider the attack α ∈ Rω against τ . Then since σ is
winning and τ(α ↾ n+1) = fα↾n(α(n)) ∈ range(fα↾n) ⊆ σ(c(α ↾ n)), it follows that
{τ(α ↾ n+ 1) : n < ω} 6∈ B. Thus τ witnesses II ↑ G1(R,¬B).
Now let σ witness II ↑ G1(R,¬B). For s ∈ R<ω, define fs ∈ C(R) by fs(R) =
σ(s⌢〈R〉). Let τ(∅) = range(f∅) ∈ A, and for x ∈ τ(∅), choose R〈x〉 ∈ R such
that x = f∅(R〈x〉) (for other x ∈
⋃
A, choose R〈x〉 arbitrarily as it won’t be used).
Now let s ∈ (
⋃
A)<ω, and suppose Rs↾n⌢〈x〉 ∈ R has been defined for n ≤ |s| and
x ∈
⋃
A. Then let τ(s⌢〈x〉) = range(f〈Rs↾0,...,Rs,Rs⌢〈x〉〉) and for y ∈ τ(s) choose
Rs⌢〈x,y〉 such that x = f〈Rs↾0,...,Rs,Rs⌢〈x〉〉(Rs⌢〈x,y〉) (and again, choose Rs⌢〈x,y〉
arbitrarily for other y ∈
⋃
A as it won’t be used).
Then let α attack τ , so α(n) ∈ τ(α ↾ n) and thus α(n) = f〈Rα↾0,...,Rα↾n〉(Rα↾n+1) =
σ(〈Rα↾0, . . . , Rα↾n+1〉). Since σ is winning, {σ(〈Rα↾0, . . . , Rα↾n+1〉) : n < ω} =
{α(n) : n < ω} 6∈ B. Thus τ witnesses I ↑ G1(A,B). 
Theorem 16. Let R be a reflection of A.
Then II ↑ G1(A,B) if and only if I ↑ G1(R,¬B).
Proof. Let σ witness II ↑ G1(A,B). Let s ∈ (
⋃
A)<ω and assume a(s) ∈ A|s| is
defined (of course, a(∅) = ∅). Suppose for all R ∈ R there existed f(R) ∈ R such
that for all A ∈ A, σ(a(s)⌢〈A〉) 6= f(R). Then f ∈ C(R) and range(f) ∈ A, and
thus σ(a(s)⌢〈range(f)〉) 6= f(R) for all R ∈ R, a contradiction. So let τ(s) ∈ R
satisfy for all x ∈ τ(s) there exists a(s⌢〈x〉) ∈ A|s|+1 extending a(s) such that
x = σ(a(s⌢〈x〉)).
If τ is attacked by α ∈ (
⋃
R)ω, then α(n) ∈ τ(α ↾ n). So α(n) = σ(a(α ↾ n+1)),
and since σ is winning, {σ(a(α ↾ n+ 1)) : n < ω} = {α(n) : n < ω} ∈ B. Therefore
τ witnesses I ↑ G1(R,¬B).
Now let σ witness I ↑ G1(R,¬B). Let s ∈ A<ω , and suppose r(s) ∈ (
⋃
R)|s| is de-
fined (again, r(∅) = ∅). For A ∈ A choose fA ∈ C(R) where range(fA) ⊆ A, and let
τ(s⌢〈A〉) = fA(σ(r(s))), and let r(s⌢〈A〉) extend r(s) by letting r(s⌢〈A〉)(|s|) =
τ(s⌢〈A〉).
If τ is attacked by α ∈ Aω, then since τ(α ↾ n + 1) = fα(n)(σ(r(α ↾ n)) ∈
α(n) ∩ σ(r(α ↾ n)) and σ is winning, we conclude that τ is a legal strategy and
{τ(α ↾ n+ 1) : n < ω} ∈ B. Therefore τ witnesses II ↑ G1(A,B). 
Corollary 17. If R is a reflection of A, then G1(A,B) and G1(R,¬B) are both
perfect information dual and Markov information dual.
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3. Applications of Reflections
Definition 18. Let X be a topological space and TX be a chosen basis of nonempty
sets for its topology.
• Let TX,x = {U ∈ TX : x ∈ U} be the local point-base at x ∈ X .
• Let ΩX,x = {Y ⊆ X : ∀U ∈ TX,x(U ∩ Y 6= ∅)} be the fan at x ∈ X .
• Let TX,F = {U ∈ TX : F ⊆ U} be the local finite-base at F ∈ [X ]<ℵ0 .
• Let OX = {U ⊆ TX :
⋃
U = X} be the collection of basic open covers of
X .
• Let PX = {TX,x : x ∈ X} be the collection of local point-bases of X .
• Let ΩX = {U ⊆ TX : ∀F ∈ [X ]
<ℵ0∃U ∈ U(F ⊆ U)} be the collection of
basic ω-covers of X .
• Let FX = {TX,F : F ∈ [X ]<ℵ0} be the collection of local finite-bases of X .
• Let DX = {Y ⊆ X : ∀U ∈ TX(U ∩ Y 6= ∅)} be the collection of dense
subsets of X .
• Let ΓX,x = {Y ⊆ X : ∀U ∈ TX,x(Y \ U ∈ [X ]<ℵ0)} be the collection of
converging fans at x ∈ X . (When intersected with [X ]ℵ0 , these are the
non-trivial sequences of X converging to x.)
While these notions were defined in terms of a particular basis, the reader may
verify the the following.
Proposition 19. Let A′ be a selection basis for A.
• I ↑ G1(A,B)⇔ I ↑ G1(A′,B).
• I ↑
pre
G1(A,B)⇔ I ↑
pre
G1(A′,B).
• II ↑ G1(A,B)⇔ II ↑ G1(A
′,B).
• II ↑
mark
G1(A,B)⇔ II ↑
mark
G1(A′,B).
Proposition 20. Each selection set in Definition 18 is a selection basis for the set
defined by replacing TX with the set of all nonempty open sets in X.
As such, the choice of topological basis is irrelevant when playing selection games
using these sets.
We may now establish (or re-establish) the following dual games.
Proposition 21. PX is a reflection of OX .
Proof. For every open cover U , the corresponding choice function f ∈ C(PX) is
simply the witness that x ∈ f(TX,x) ∈ U . 
Corollary 22. G1(OX ,B) and G1(PX ,¬B) are perfect-information and Markov-
information dual.
In the case that B = OX , G1(OX ,OX) is the well-known Rothberger game, and
G1(PX ,¬OX) is isomorphic to the point-open game PO(X): I chooses points of
X , II chooses an open neighborhood of each chosen point, and I wins if II’s choices
are a cover. So this was simply the classic result that the Rothberger game and
point-open game are perfect-information dual [5], and the more recent result that
these games are Markov-information dual [3].
Proposition 23. FX is a reflection of ΩX
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Proof. For every ω-cover U , the corresponding choice function f ∈ C(FX) is simply
the witness that F ⊆ f(TX,F ) ∈ U . 
Corollary 24. G1(ΩX ,B) and G1(FX ,¬B) are perfect-information and Markov-
information dual.
Note that in the case that B = ΩX , G1(ΩX ,ΩX) is the Rothberger game played
with ω-covers, and G1(FX ,¬ΩX) is isomorphic to the Ω-finite-open game ΩFO(X):
I chooses finite subsets of X , II chooses an open neighborhood of each chosen finite
set, and I wins if II’s choices are an ω-cover. These games were shown to be dual
in [3].
Proposition 25. TX is a reflection of DX .
Proof. For every dense D, the corresponding choice function f ∈ C(TX) is simply
the witness that f(U) ∈ U ∩D. 
Corollary 26. G1(DX ,B) and G1(TX ,¬B) are perfect-information and Markov-
information dual.
In the case that B = ΩX,x for some x ∈ X , G1(DX ,ΩX,x) is the strong countable
dense fan-tightness game at x, see e.g. [1]. G1(TX ,¬ΩX,x) is the game CL(X, x)
first studied by Tkachuk in [10]. Tkachuk showed in that paper that these games
are perfect-information dual; Clontz and Holshouser previously showed these were
Markov-information dual in the case that X = Cp(Y ) [3].
In the case that B = DX , then G1(DX ,DX) is the strong selective separability
game introduced in [8], and G1(TX ,¬DX) is the point-picking game of Berner and
Juha´sz defined in [2]. Scheepers showed that these were perfect-information dual
in his paper.
Proposition 27. TX,x is a reflection of ΩX,x.
Proof. For every set Y with limit point x, the corresponding choice function f ∈
C(TX,x) is simply the witness that f(U) ∈ U ∩ Y . 
Corollary 28. G1(ΩX,x,B) and G1(TX,x,¬B) are perfect-information and Markov-
information dual.
In the case that B = ΓX,x for some x ∈ X , G1(TX,x,¬ΓX,x) is Gruenhage’s
W game [6]. Its dual G1(ΩX,x,ΓX,x) characterizes the strong Fre´chet-Urysohn
property I 6↑
pre
G1(ΩX,x,ΓX,x) at x, which now seen to be equivalent to II 6↑
mark
G1(TX,x,¬ΓX,x). This allows us to obtain the following result.
Corollary 29. I 6↑
pre
G1(ΩX,x,ΓX,x) if and only if I 6↑ G1(ΩX,x,ΓX,x).
Proof. As shown in [9], a space is w at x, that is, II 6↑ G1(TX,x,¬ΓX,x) if and only
if I 6↑
pre
G1(ΩX,x,ΓX,x) for all x ∈ X . 
For B = ΩX,x, G1(TX,x,¬ΩX,x) is the variant of Gruenhage’s W game for clus-
tering. This game is now seen to be dual to the strong countable fan tightness game
G1(ΩX,x,ΩX,x) at x.
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4. Open Questions
Question 30. Does there exist a natural reflection for ΓX,x or ΓX = {U ⊆ TX :
∀x ∈ X(U \ TX,x ∈ [TX ]<ℵ0)}?
Question 31. Can these results be extended for Gfin(A,B)?
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